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Abstract
There is ample evidence that different beliefs about how to achieve shared goals are common
in political organizations like government agencies, campaigns, and NGOs. However, the
consequences of such conflicts have not yet been explored. We develop a formal model in
which a principal and an agent disagree about the right policy for achieving their shared
goals. Disagreement creates a motivational problem, but we show how both observing policy
outcomes and experimenting with policies can ameliorate it. We also show that the principal
often defers to the agent in order to motivate him, thereby generating more informative
policy outcomes and building future consensus. Most surprisingly, she sometimes allows the
agent to implement his desired policy even when she is sure it is wrong to persuade him
through failure that he is mistaken. Using the model we generate empirical implications
about performance measurement and Presidential appointments in U.S. federal agencies.
1 Introduction
Within political organizations, strong and open disagreements about how to achieve shared
goals are common. For example, President Obama, his cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs openly
held strong and differing opinions about how many troops were necessary to succeed with
an Afghanistan “surge” (Gates 2014). Similarly, during the 2006 election cycle there was
vicious public disagreement within the Democratic party about the wisdom of Howard Dean’s
“50-state strategy” – prominent Democratic strategist Paul Begala famously described it as
“just hiring a bunch of staff people to wander around Utah and Mississippi and pick their
nose” (Bai 2006). Anecdotes aside, political organizations like public bureaucracies, political
campaigns, and NGOs have many structural features that make them particularly vulnerable
to belief conflicts. Individuals often choose to work for such organizations precisely because
of their zeal for the “public good” and their strong beliefs about how to achieve it (Besley and
Ghatak 2006, Perry and Hondeghem 2008). In addition, the manner in which the federal
government is staffed – with elected political principals, appointed political agents, and
long-term career bureaucrats – all but ensures that individuals with very different personal
backgrounds and professional training will be forced to work together (Heclo 1977).
Among scholars of policy studies, the notion that conflict can be driven by different be-
liefs about “how the world works” is familiar (Sabatier 1988). However, scholars of political
agency and bureaucratic politics have yet to analyze the consequences of open “disagree-
ment on beliefs,” and whether such conflicts really “differ significantly from those caused by
conflicting objectives” (Bendor and Hammond 1992).1 In particular, despite the frequency
of such disagreements in government agencies, it is not yet known how they affect policy
decisions and the delegation of Congressional authority (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004), not to
mention internal capacity (Ting 2011), performance (Lewis 2008), and organizational learn-
1In a rare exception, Bendor and Hammond (1992) briefly conjecture that belief conflicts
in organizations are generally less destructive than goal conflicts because they might be
resolved through deliberation.
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ing (Callander 2011). The canonical model of political agency instead considers a principal-
agent relationship in which an agent has both different goals and better information than
his principal, and focuses on the tradeoff between the value of the agent’s “greater expertise
about the likely effects” of different policies, and the danger that the agent might “pursue
goals that diverge from those of” the principal (Stephenson 2007). While such models have
yielded deep insights about inter-branch conflict and the design of bureaucratic institutions,
they cannot be used to study the consequences of open belief disagreement because, by con-
struction, any disagreement cannot be open – if the principal knew the agent’s beliefs, then
she could also infer his information and use it to revise her own beliefs.2
More generally, the inability of rational actors to persist in open disagreement is a well-
known property of models which assume that differences in beliefs are solely the result of
differences in information, which is known in economic theory as the common priors as-
sumption (Aumann 1987).3 However, the reality of contemporary politics is that differences
in beliefs about “how the world works” often persist even after vigorous deliberation and
debate (Mutz 2008). In this paper we therefore develop a formal model to understand the
implications of such disagreement for the management of political organizations. Specifically,
we consider a model in which a principal and an agent have common goals, but heterogeneous
prior beliefs about which of two available policy instruments will be effective for achieving
them. While assuming heterogeneous priors is unorthodox, there is a small but growing lit-
erature in political science and economics that does so to study a variety of topics, including
conflict (Smith and Stam 2004), bargaining (Yildiz 2004), expertise acquisition (Che and
2See Gailmard and Patty (2012) for a review.
3Specifically, with common priors there cannot be common knowledge of disagreement;
moreover, if beliefs are truthfully communicated back-and-forth then they cannot diverge
indefinitely (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1982). Worth noting is that Aumman’s result
does not mean that open disagreement cannot result from differences in information; just
that it cannot result from differences in information only. For example, Geanakoplos (1994)
discusses how open disagreement can result from the combinableion of different information
and processing errors.
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Kartik 2009), and firm management (Van den Steen 2010).4
Our baseline model has a simple structure. The principal and agent share a common goal
that they wish to achieve in each of two periods. In each period, the principal can choose
from two possible policies to achieve the goal. However, her policy must be implemented
by the agent, whose effort is not directly observable to the principal.5 The agent’s effort
increases the chance that an effective policy succeeds, but only one of the two policies is
“in truth” effective, and the principal and agent disagree about which policy this is (in the
sense of heterogeneous priors). Finally, the direct effects of the policies cannot be immedi-
ately observed; the principal and agent therefore cannot resolve their disagreement through
communication, deliberation, or learning.
To understand the logic of the model, consider the following highly stylized example. A
city is attempting to combat a wave of violent crime over time. However, the true underlying
cause of the crime wave is unknown. One proposed theory is that the city has simply
accumulated a large number of violent criminals. The other is that the presence of petty crime
and general disorder causes the community to disengage and thereby encourages all crime,
i.e. “broken windows” theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Consequently, the city’s mayor
(the principal) and her police chief (the agent) disagree over whether the city’s approach
to controlling the crime wave should focus predominantly on solving violent crimes and
apprehending their perpetrators, or focus on maintaining community order by punishing
petty crimes. Finally, whichever policy is chosen must also be implemented by the police
force with sufficient effort to be successful.
An important feature of our baseline model is that the agent cannot be directly mon-
itored or incentivized to take certain actions. This is a realistic depiction of management
in most political organizations including public bureaucracies, where employment contracts
4See also Morris (1995) and Gul (1998) for arguments in support of relaxing the common
priors assumption.
5The assumption that effort is unobservable is appropriate for many public bureaucracies,
but especially so of “street level bureaucracies” (Lipsky 1980) such as teachers, firefighters,
and policemen.
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are tightly constrained by legislation and inter-branch bargaining (Lewis 2008). However,
the agent is also intrinsically motivated to work; what motivates him is believing that he is
working to implement an effective policy for achieving the organization’s goals. As a result,
disagreement about the right policy creates a difficult managerial problem for the principal.
If she imposes the policy that she believes will be best, the agent be less motivated to im-
plement it because he believes it is unlikely to be effective. Alternatively, if she defers to
the agent by selecting his desired policy, then he will be more motivated to work; but on
a policy that the principal believes to be inferior. Returning to our example, if the chief
strongly believes in focusing on violent crimes, then he will be demoralized by being forced
to waste energy rounding up pick-pockets and fare-beaters. If the mayor instead believes in
“broken windows,” then she only has two bad choices; a demoralized chief, or an ineffective
policy.
The model described thus far captures what Wilson’s (1989) seminal study of bureau-
cracy refers to as “coping organizations” in which neither inputs – the agent’s effort – nor
outputs – success or failure – can be observed. The principal copes with disagreement in
her organization, but cannot resolve it. Consequently, the model is functionally identical to
one in which the principal and the agent simply have different preferences, in that similar
patterns of behavior can be derived by instead assuming that the principal and agent both
like to achieve the common goal, but simply prefer to achieve it with different policies.
What makes beliefs different, however, is that they can change. In many environments,
policies can be tried out, their outcomes are observed, and those outcomes can be used to
draw lessons about how to approach the policy problem in the future (May 1992, Hall 1993).
To explore this fundamental distinction between preferences and beliefs, we next consider a
second variant of the model in which the players can observe whether the first period policy
succeeded prior to choosing and implementing a policy in the second. Unlike the previous
variant, the players can now learn more about which policy is correct, and revise their beliefs
and actions in the second period. In our example, this is analogous to the city police force
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beginning to collect and analyze real-time crime statistics, allowing it to measure the efficacy
of its policy and make changes if necessary.
The second variant of our model captures what Wilson (1989) refers to as “craft organi-
zations” – the agent’s effort cannot be observed, but the results of that effort can be both
observed and learned from. Importantly, the ability to observe outcomes in this variant also
means that the principal can experiment with policies – that is, try one out, and decide
whether to keep it based on the results. The idea that governments might actively design
“policies as experiments” to learn about their efficacy dates back to the era of social engi-
neering in the late 60’s and 70’s (Campbell 1969), and is currently resurgent in the field of
public ecological management (Lee 1993). However, although there is a small and growing
literature in political science that analyzes policy experimentation (Callander 2011, Volden,
Ting, and Carpenter 2008), there is currently no work analyzing the effects of experimenta-
tion in a principal-agent setting. By comparing the variants of our model with and without
learning, we can therefore learn both about the distinction between belief conflict and goal
conflict, and also about the differences between political organizations that can learn and
experiment, and those that cannot.
Our main results from the model with learning and experimentation are as follows. First,
the agent is both more motivated, and successes are more likely, relative to the model without
learning. Surprisingly, this is true even when the principal does not experiment at all, and
instead rigidly implements the same policy in both periods. The reason for this effect is
crucial for our subsequent results. When a policy is implemented well, its failure can be better
attributed to the policy itself rather than its poor implementation; in other words, failure is
informative. However, when a policy is implemented poorly, a failure could either be due both
to the policy itself and to its poor implementation, i.e. it is uninformative. Consequently,
agent can actually make the first period policy outcome more informative by simply working
harder. In equilibrium, he will choose to do so because he values learning about the right
policy in order to avoid wasting his effort on the wrong one in the future. Consequently,
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when outcomes are observable the agent works both harder and more efficiently, leading to
a greater chance of success in both periods.
Our second result is that the agent is even more motivated when the principal experiments
with policies, rather than rigidly implementing a single one she believes to be best. Thus, we
find that there is a motivational benefit to experimentation that is independent of “searching”
for the best policy (Callander 2011). The reason is that experimenting ties the principal’s
future policy decision to the initial outcome, which gives the agent the power to indirectly
improve policy decisions by working harder to ensure that those outcomes are informative.
Moreover, this effect persists even when the agent strongly disagrees with the principal’s
initial policy – he never “sabotages” the policy to ensure failure and a change. An additional
implication of this result is that the principal sometimes underexperiments relative to what
would maximize her utility; this occurs when she believes too strongly in the initial policy
to credibly abandon it after a single failure. Consequently, we show that the principal
can sometimes benefit from institutional arrangements that force her to experiment, which
include institutionalizing trigger mechanisms (Nie and Schultz 2012), and delegating her
policy decisions to an individual with more moderate beliefs.
Our third result is that the principal’s decisions about which policy to experiment with
are biased toward the agent, in the sense of placing greater weight on his beliefs than her own.
As a consequence, the principal often experiments with the policy initially desired agent even
when she is more sure that it is wrong than the agent is sure that it is right. This additional
tendency towards deference in the model with learning arises for two reasons. First, the
principal can better motivate the agent by deferring to him. Second, when outcomes are
observable this extra motivation is more valuable; it increases the informativeness of policy
outcomes and thus learning, which improves both players’ future decisions and also helps to
build consensus.
Our final, and potentially most novel, result is that the degree of deference exhibited by
the principal in our model far exceeds what can occur in traditional political agency models.
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In these models, a principal only defers to an agent to exploit his superior expertise about
“how the world works” – thus, when she is certain that she already knows the right policy,
she never defers. In our model, however, the principal sometimes initially defers to the
agent even when she is already sure that his policy is wrong. She does so to try to persuade
him that he is mistaken by allowing him to implement the policy he believes is best, work
hard, and nevertheless watch it fail. Public managers often extol the benefits of a hands
off management style that “turn[s] responsibility back onto the worker” (Bratton 1998).
Our model illustrates how such a style is useful not only for extracting good ideas from
subordinates in political organizations, but also helping them learn more quickly when their
ideas are bad.
Overall, our analysis makes the following main contributions. First, it begins to identify
the differences between conflict over “goals” and conflict over “beliefs” in political organi-
zations. Second, it provides a fresh perspective on a variety of managerial techniques in
real-world public bureaucracies that have been extensively discussed in both the political
science and public administration literatures; specifically, we show that there are motiva-
tional benefits to measuring performance, encouraging experimentation, appointing ideolog-
ical moderates to run agencies, and exercising deference to subordinates. Third, it generates
a variety of new testable empirical implications about management patterns in political or-
ganizations, and especially about the effects of performance measurement in U.S. federal
agencies. We discuss these implications extensively after presenting the formal model. Fi-
nally, it contributes to the small but growing literature on policy experimentation in political
environments.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model, and in Section 3
we analyze the variant without learning. In Section 4 we introduce the model with learning
and analyze the agent’s decisions, and in Section 5 we provide four key results about the
principal’s policy choices. In Section 6 we discuss empirical implications, and in Section 7
we conclude.
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2 The Model
The model is a two period game of policy choice and implementation between a principal
and an agent. Player 1 is the principal, and in each period t ∈ {1, 2} publicly chooses a
course of action xt from the set X = {a, b}. Henceforth the principal’s choice is referred
to as a policy. However, it may be thought of more generally as how her organization will
pursue a goal. Player 2 is the agent. In each period, after observing the principal’s choice,
the agent implements the organization’s policy with unobservable effort et ∈ [0, 1].
The principal and the agent seek to achieve a shared organizational goal in each period;
for simplicity we assume that the outcome in each period yt can either be to succeed at
that goal (yt = 1) or to fail (yt = 0). The model is agnostic as to why the agent shares the
organization’s goals, and many possible reasons are supported in the literature. It could
be that the agent selected into, or was chosen by, an organization whose goals he already
intrinsically shared.6 Alternatively, the agent may have been actively socialized so that she
comes to share the organization’s goals, as is common in “mission driven organizations” in
both the public and nonprofit sectors (Kaufman 1967, DiIulio 1987, Goodsell 2011). The
agent could have an intrinsic preference for “doing his job” and define it as fulfilling his
superiors’ goals; such “role perception” by bureaucrats is supported by case study research
(Wilson 1989, Golden 2000). Or success could align with the agent’s career concerns by
ensuring his organization remain well funded or enhancing his promotion prospects.
Exerting effort is assumed to be costly to the agent, and this cost takes the form
− (et)2 /2λ where λ is bounded between λ and λ¯.7 This cost can be thought of as aris-
ing from an inherent aversion to work, or perhaps more realistically from the agent’s need
6See Lipsky (1980), Brehm (1999), Perry and Hondeghem (2008) in political science and
public administration, and Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996), Besley and Ghatak (2006),
and Prendergast (2008) in economics.
7λ¯ ≈ .68466 is a necessary and sufficient bound to keep the agent’s first period effort
well-behaved and less than 1 - it is characterized in the proof of Proposition 1. The lower
bound λ ≈ .23505 is derived in the proof of Proposition 7 – intuitively, it ensures that the
effect of the agent’s beliefs on his effort is not trivial.
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to take time away from other productive activities. The managerial problem that arises in
our model is thus bureaucratic slack, i.e. the agent pursuing his “mandates with insufficient
effort,” rather than bureaucratic drift, i.e. the agent pursuing policies that do not achieve
principal’s goals (Bueno De Mesquita and Stephenson 2007). The parameter λ determines
how willing the agent is to expend effort to achieve the organization’s goals, and thus captures
the strength of the agent’s intrinsic motivation.
For simplicity we assume that the players place equal weight on payoffs in each period;
this assumption best captures environments where goals must be achieved repeatedly over
time, such as minimizing the level of a pollutant, reducing crime, or maximizing the output
of a natural resource. However, our insights about how the potential for learning impacts
initial choices clearly extend to settings where the second period is more important than the
first, such as a trial or pilot project. Summarizing, the player’s payoffs given effort levels
and outcomes over the two periods are,
y1 + y2 (Principal)(
y1 +
(e1)
2
2λ
)
+
(
y2 +
(e2)
2
2λ
)
(Agent)
How Successes Occurs Intuitively, the success or failure of a policy depends both on
whether it is fundamentally well-suited to achieve the intended goal, and on how well it
is implemented. To capture these intuitions, we assume that “nature” initially draws a
state ω = {a, b} determining which of the two policies is actually the “correct” one to
achieve the goal. In both periods, the probability that the correct policy (xt = ω) succeeds
is equal to the agent’s implementation effort et, while the incorrect policy (xt 6= ω) always
fails. Thus, more effort results in a higher chance of success, but only when exerted on the
correct policy. Our framework is standard in the economics literature on learning through
experimentation with effort.8 Its key substantive property is that choosing well and exerting
8Discrete and continuous time versions include Bergemann and Hege (2005) and Keller,
Rady, and Cripps (2005).
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effort are complementary to achieving an organizational success, i.e., that both are necessary
inputs.
A policy problem that might take this form is identifying the root cause of air pollution
in a municipality; city bureaucrats may be uncertain about whether high observed pollution
levels are predominantly the result of emissions from refineries or from automobiles. To
successfully improve air quality, they must both correctly identify the “root cause,” and to
expend effort effectively regulating the true source.9
Modeling Good Faith Disagreement To model good faith disagreement, we assume
that the players have heterogeneous prior beliefs about the probability that ω = a, i.e. that
a is the correct policy. Specifically, each player i has their own prior belief θi that ω = a.
The principal initially believes that a is more likely to be correct
(
θ1 ≥ 12
)
, while the agent
believes that b is more likely to be correct
(
θ2 ≤ 12
)
. They know each others’ prior beliefs,
and thus fully understand the nature of their initial disagreement. In the preceding example,
the principal could be a city manager who believes that the existing weight of evidence falls
on refineries as the root cause of high pollution levels, while the agent is a city bureaucrat
charged with implementing the policy who believes that automobiles are more likely to be
the root cause. We will use Pi (·) to denote probabilities evaluated with respect to the prior
of player i – so for example, P2 (ω = b) = 1− θ2 denotes the agent’s prior belief that b is the
correct policy.
Learning and Experimentation To isolate the effects of learning and experimentation
we compare two variants of the model. In the first variant, policy outcomes are never observed
– thus, disagreement persists unchanged throughout the game. We refer to this variant as
the No Learning Benchmark. It captures policymaking environments where outcomes cannot
be reliably measured and/or circumstances are changing too rapidly for useful learning to
9This example roughly captures efforts by Los Angeles to control escalating smog levels
in the 1960s (Krier 1977).
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occur. In the second variant, both players publicly observe whether the first period policy
succeeded or failed (i.e. the value of y1) prior to making their decisions in the second period.
This allows them to learn from the initial outcome before making their subsequent policy
decisions.
How will this learning occur? This is straightforward to see by considering the players’
posterior beliefs from Bayes’ rule. Suppose that the principal initially chooses policy x1 = a,
and the agent implements it with effort e1. If a success is observed (y1 = 1), then updating
is simple – since only the correct policy can succeed, both the principal and the agent will
infer and agree after success that a is definitely the correct policy.
What if a fails? Then the players could ascribe it both to a being incorrect, or to it
simply having been implemented with insufficient effort. Specifically, each player i computes
a posterior belief that a failed despite being correct equal to,
h
(
e1, θi
)
=
θi (1− e1)
θi (1− e1) + (1− θi) < θi. (1)
This is her prior assessment θi (1− e1) of the probability that a was correct but still failed,
divided by the unconditional prior probability of failure. This posterior belief is lower than
the prior θi – that is, failure is always a negative signal. However, how much lower depends
on how hard e1 the agent worked to implement a. Intuitively, the harder the agent worked,
the more the players will ascribe failure to the policy being fundamentally incorrect, rather
than simply poorly implemented. Thus, greater effort by the agent makes failure more
informative about the correct policy.
This intuitive property has an important implication for our analysis – it means that
more implementation effort by the agent can both increase learning, and by implication
reduce future disagreement. Returning to the pollution example, suppose that regulations
are imposed on refineries, but the effects of this policy on pollution are ultimately observed to
be minimal. This policy failure provides some indirect evidence that automobile emissions
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may actually be the root cause of the high pollution. However, the indirect evidence is
even stronger if the bureaucrat strongly enforced regulations on refineries than if he weakly
enforced them.
We now analyze the two variants of the model.
3 The No Learning Benchmark
Without learning, choices and outcomes in the first period do not affect beliefs and incentives
in the second. Consequently, the players consider each period in isolation. The agent is a
necessary intermediary for policy implementation, and for the organization to succeed he
must exert high effort. However, his effort only makes a difference if the principal chose the
correct policy. Formally, his subjective expected payoff to exerting effort et to implement
policy xt is
P2
(
ω = xt
) · et − (et)2
2λ
, (2)
where P2 (ω = x
t) is his subjective prior assessment that the principal chose correctly. His
optimal responses to the principal’s policy decisions are consequently as follows.
Observation 1. In a best-response, the agent exerts effort et to implement policy xt equal
to
e∗
(
xt
)
=
 λθ2 if x
t = a
λ (1− θ2) if xt = b
.
His subjective expected utility is
U∗2
(
xt
)
=

λ
2
(θ2)
2 if xt = a
λ
2
(1− θ2)2 if xt = b
.
The left panel of Figure 1 depicts the agent’s optimal effort on each policy, which is
an increasing (linear) function of his belief that the principal chose correctly. The basic
model captures two key features of management in political organizations, where agents are
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intrinsically motivated and their superiors lack strong direct mechanisms of control. First,
the agent’s effort is increasing the strength of his intrinsic motivation, which is captured by
the parameter λ (see also Besley and Ghatak (2006)). Second, to motivate their subordinates
to work hard, leaders must make decisions that their subordinates believe will be effective in
achieving the organization’s goals.
Figure 1: Effort and Policy Choice in the No Learning Benchmark  
Agent’s optimal effort 
  
agent’s beliefs θ2 =1/ 2θ2 = 0
effort 
λ / 2
λ
effort on b  
  
effort on a 
  
Principal chooses a 
  
No Learning Benchmark 
principal’s  
beliefs 
agent’s beliefs 
Principal chooses b 
θ1 =1−θ2
Good faith disagreement thus creates a special kind of agency problem. If principal
imposes the policy that she thinks is best, the agent will be less motivated, believing that
his effort would be wasted on an ineffective policy. Alternatively, if the principal defers to
the agent, then this will better motivate him – but from the principal’s perspective, there
are better than even odds that this extra motivation is useless. Either resolution entails a
cost, either in terms of choosing well or in terms of motivating the agent.10 The following
observation states that in the unique equilibrium, the principal resolves this dilemma by
deferring to the agent if and only if his belief that b is the right policy is stronger than her
own belief that a is the right policy.
10See also Van den Steen (2009) for a similar managerial dilemma in a firm setting.
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Observation 2. In the unique equilibrium of the No Learning Benchmark, the principal
defers to the agent and chooses policy x∗ = b in both periods if and only if the agent’s belief
that b is correct is stronger than her own belief that a is correct, i.e. 1− θ2 ≥ θ1. Otherwise,
she imposes policy x∗ = a in every period. Her subjective expected payoff in every period is,
U∗1 =
 λθ1θ2 if x
∗ = a
λ (1− θ1) (1− θ2) if x∗ = b
.
The right panel of Figure 1 depicts the unique equilibrium policy x∗ as a function of the
player’s beliefs (θ1, θ2). Although the principal defers to agent when his beliefs in favor of b
are sufficiently strong, her rationale is very different than in classic political agency models,
where deference is driven by the desire to exploit an agent’s superior expertise. In our model,
the agent has the same preferences as the principal, and the principal does not ascribe his
difference in beliefs to superior expertise – she simply disagrees with him. When she defers,
she does so because she has no other good option. She needs him to work, cannot force
him to do, and concludes that more effort on an inferior policy is a better bet overall than
less effort on a superior policy. The outcome is therefore inefficient in the sense that the
principal would always prefer a scenario where she can select policy a and the agent believes
she chose correctly (i.e. θ1 · 1 > max {θ1θ2, (1− θ1) (1− θ2)} for all θ2).
4 The Game with Learning
We now analyze the game when policy outcomes can be observed; the players can thus
learn more about which policy is correct, as well as experiment with policies. This vari-
ant of the model captures political organizations where either the outcomes of interest are
straightforward to observe, or where reliable “performance measurement” of the organiza-
tion’s outputs has been introduced; we later return to this interpretation when we discuss
empirical implications.
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In the literature on decisionmaking in public organizations, the rationales given for mea-
suring performance have typically been to either help public managers learn in order to
make better policy decisions, or to reward and sanction them for their behavior. The former
draws inspiration from theories of organizational learning (Moynihan 2008, Ch. 9), while the
latter draws on classical principal-agent theory in economics (Kettl 2005, Ch. 3). Our focus,
however, is new; we ask how performance measurement and learning affect the management
of political organizations with intrinsically motivated subordinates and good faith disagree-
ment. How will the ability to observe policy outcomes change the incentives of the agent?
When will the principal choose to experiment, and why? And how can experimentation be
exploited to reduce good-faith disagreement?
Formally, a pure strategy for the principal in the two-period game with learning consists
of a first period policy x1, and a second period policy x2 (x1, y1) for each first period policy
x1 and outcome y1. In theory the space of possible strategies is large – the principal could
always switch policies after the first period regardless of the outcome, or keep the initial
policy only if it fails. However, we can rule these strategies because success persuades both
players that the initial policy was correct. Thus, the principal’s strategy must therefore
satisfy the following conditions.
Observation 3. In a pure strategy equilibrium, for each possible policy x1 the principal
either
• rigidly implements x1, i.e., chooses it in both periods regardless of the first period
outcome (x2 (x1, y1 = 1) = x2 (x1, y1 = 0) = x1)
• experiments with x1, i.e. chooses it again in second period if it succeeds (x2 (x1, y1 = 1) = x1)
and switches to the alternative (x2 (x1, y1 = 0) 6= x1) if it fails.
In the remainder of this section we characterize how the agent will respond to these two
management strategies, i.e. experimenting with vs. rigidly implementing policies. In the
subsequent section we complete the equilibrium analysis by characterizing how the principal
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will make her policy choices given her own initial beliefs about the right policy and the
agent’s incentives.
To clarify the exposition, the mathematical details of the characterization are relegated
to online appendices. Appendix A provides a general equilibrium characterization, and
Appendix B proves the main propositions; Appendix C and an accompanying Mathematica
file verify less-critical steps. In the general equilibrium characterization the players may use
mixed strategies, but we show in the Online Appendix that the principal is always best off
in a pure strategy equilibrium. Since our focus is on what the principal can achieve by
managing the agent, we henceforth select this equilibrium for the remainder of the analysis.
Rigid Implementation and Effort
A principal who rigidly implements policies by definition ignores outcomes when making her
decisions. However, this does not mean that the ability to observe outcomes has no effect.
The reason is that the agent will still use it to try to learn which policy is correct, in order
to avoid wasting his costly effort on an ineffective policy.
To understand how the ability to observe outcomes affects the agent’s incentives, we
analyze his optimization problem by working backwards. If the principal’s strategy is to
rigidly implement policy a (i.e. x1 = a, x2 (a, 1) = x2 (a, 0) = a), then in the second and
final period the agent anticipates that he will exert effort based on his posterior belief a is
the right policy after observing the initial outcome, i.e. e2 = λP2 (ω = a | y1). Using this,
it is straightforward to show that his two-period expected utility as a function of his initial
first period effort e1 to implement a is:
(
θ2e
1 − (e
1)
2
2λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
first period payoff
+
λ
2
θ2
(
e1 +
(
1− e1)h (e1, θ2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
second period payoff
. (3)
Details of the derivation are presented in online Appendix A,11 but the expression can be
11By symmetry, the agent’s two-period expected utility when the principal rigidly imple-
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intuitively understood as follows. The first term is the agent’s first period expected payoff
as a function of his implementation effort e1, and is identical to his per-period payoff in the
No Learning benchmark. The second term is his expected future payoff as a function of his
initial effort, and it is increasing in effort for the following reason. More initial effort results
in a more informative first period outcome, and thus better learning by the agent. This
benefits him in the second period by allowing him to better calibrate his effort; that is, to
work hard if the policy is the right one, and avoid wasting effort if it is not. Formally, the
expression e1 + (1− e1)h (e1, θ2) is the agent’s average posterior belief that a is correct when
it is actually correct, and this effectively captures how accurate the agent’s future beliefs will
be after observing the initial outcome.
The presence of a “learning premium” to early effort when policy outcomes are observable
generates the following result.
Proposition 1. When the principal plans to rigidly implement some policy x ∈ {a, b},
observing outcomes increases the agent’s first period effort, and the probability of success in
both periods, relative to the No Learning benchmark.
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the agent’s first period effort on each policy in both the
No Learning benchmark and the game with learning and rigid implementation.
The managerial implications of Proposition 1 are surprising. When subordinates are
intrinsically motivated, the ability to measure and observe organizational outcomes both
increases the efficiency of agents’ efforts, and better motivates them overall, even when supe-
riors do not even use the information in their decisions. The reason is simple: intrinsically
motivated subordinates still value the information for allocating their time and effort, and
they can generate more reliable information by working harder. Our results suggest that
recent critiques of performance measurement in public organizations based on the obser-
vation that policymakers rarely use performance data are missing an important dimension
(e.g. Pollitt 2006). Indeed, consistent with this result, an analysis by the U.S. Government
ments policy b is the above expression with P2 (ω = b) = 1− θ2 substituted in for θ2
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Accountability Office (GAO) found that federal agencies value performance measurement
to improve the efficiency of their internal decisionmaking (U.S. Government Accountability
Office 2005) even when Congress ignores the information in its policy and budget-allocation
decisions.
Figure 2: Effect of Observing Outcomes and Experimenting on the Agent’s Effort
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Experimentation and Effort
A principal who experiments with policies ties her second period policy choice to the outcome
of her first period policy; formally, her strategy is to stick with the initial policy if and only
if it succeeds. This means that the data contained in policy outcomes directly informs her
choices.
A less obvious feature of experimentation, however, is that it indirectly empowers the
agent to influence the principal’s policy choices. By working hard he can increase the chance
of a success, and therefore the chance that the principal will stick with the initial policy.
By “shirking” or sabotaging the initial policy, he can decrease the chance of success, and
thus also the chance that the principal will switch to the alternative. A priori, however, the
effect of this empowerment isn’t obvious; it could magnify the agent’s willingness to work
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by increasing the cost of failing with the right policy (since the principal will then switch to
the wrong one), or it could give the agent to sabotage a policy with which he disagrees by
shirking to induce failure.12
To clarify which of these incentives dominates, we now formally analyze the agent’s
problem when the principal experiments with policy a (i.e. x1 = a, x2 (a, 1) = a and
x2 (a, 0) = b). The agent’s two-period expected utility is:13
(
−(e
1)
2
2λ
+ θ2e
1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
first period payoff
+
λ
2
(1− θ2)
(
1− h (e1, θ2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
learning term
+
λ
2
θ2e
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
policy influence term︸ ︷︷ ︸
second period payoff
. (4)
Like the utility function with rigid implementation, the expression is divided into a first and
second period term. Moreover, the first period terms are identical. However, because of
experimentation the second period term now has two subterms: a learning term representing
how the agent’s initial effort affects his future utility directly through his own learning, and a
policy influence representing how his initial effort affects his future utility indirectly through
the principal’s policy choices.
The learning term has properties that are similar to the agent’s expected second period
utility when the principal rigidly implements a. The key expression in this term is 1 −
h (e1, θ2), which is the expected value of the agent’s posterior belief that a is the wrong
policy when it is actually the wrong policy. As before, this captures how accurate the
agent’s future beliefs will be after observing the first period outcome, and it is increasing in
his initial effort e1.14
12Sabotage here differs from Brehm (1999), who defines it as “devoting time” to undermine
the principal’s goals.
13Details of the derivation are again in online Appendix A, and again by symmetry the
agent’s two-period expected utility when the principal experiments with policy b is the above
expression with 1− θ2 substituted in.
14A useful property in our simplified framework is that the derivatives of the second period
payoff in (3) and the learning term in (4) are equal. Intuitively, this means that the agent’s
incentive to exert effort for his own learning is unaffected by whether the principal rigidly
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The policy influence term λ
2
θ2e
1, however, only appears when the principal experiments.
Our key observation is that this term is always increasing in effort. Intuitively, this means
that from the agent’s perspective, working harder initially always has a beneficial effect on
the principal’s future choices. Experimenting thus never gives the agent an incentive to
“sabotage”; it always incentivizes him to work harder. Surprisingly, this is true even when
the agent is asked to implement a policy experiment he initially believes to be wrong. This
generates the following result.
Proposition 2. Regardless of the agent’s initial beliefs, a principal who experiments with a
policy x1 ∈ {a, b} elicits more first period effort than a principal who rigidly implements that
same policy.
The right panel of Figure 2 compares the agent’s first period effort on each policy when the
principal experiments with vs. rigidly implements it.
Why does experimentation incentivize the agent to work harder, even when he is working
on a policy he believes is wrong? The reason is that his conflict with the principal stems
from a good faith disagreement about which policy is better for achieving their goals, rather
than an intrinsic preference for any one policy. Consider the agent’s incentives when asked
to experimentally implement a policy that he believes to be incorrect. In theory, he could
reduce his effort to increase the probability of failure and a policy switch. But if he is right
about the policy being faulty, then it will fail anyway without his “sabotage.” Alternatively,
if he is wrong (a possibility that he entertains), then reducing his effort will raise the chance
of an accidental failure, which will induce the principal to abandon a policy that is good for
both of them. The main effect of experimentation on the agent’s incentives is thus to raise the
stakes of “getting it right” in the first period, which causes him to work harder.15 Proposition
2 thus demonstrates that there is a benefit to experimentation in political organizations that
implements or experiments with policies.
15The fact that experimentation motivates the agent is what can generate multiple equi-
libria - experimenting produces more effort, which makes failure more informative, and the
principal more willing to experiment.
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is independent of “searching” for the best policy (Callander 2011) – it can better motivate
the subordinates who are actually tasked with implementing policy choices.
5 Experimentation, Underexperimentation, and Per-
suasion
We now complete the equilibrium analysis by describing the principal’s equilibrium policy
choices given the previously analyzed incentives. To simplify the presentation, we first vi-
sually present these choices. We then discuss four properties of these choices in-depth and
provide results.
Figure 3 illustrates the principal’s equilibrium policy choices as a function of the players’
initial beliefs (holding fixed the agent’s instrinsic motivation λ).16 Recall that the agent
initially favors policy b
(
θ2 ≤ 12
)
, while the principal initially favors policy a
(
θ1 ≥ 12
)
. The
color of each region indicates the principal’s first period policy choice – in the red regions the
principal imposes policy x1 = a, while the blue regions she defers to the agent by choosing
policy x1 = b. The darkness of the shading indicates whether the principal experiments
with or rigidly implements the first period policy – in the darkly shaded regions she rigidly
implements, while in the lightly shaded regions she experiments.
Intrinsically motivated subordinates encourage experimentation
Our first result from the equilibrium analysis is that the principal is more inclined to exper-
iment when the agent is more intrinsically motivated.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, the principal experiments for a greater set of initial beliefs
(θ1, θ2) when the agent is more intrinsically motivated.
Figure 4 shows how the region of belief space where the principal experiments expands
with a more motivated (higher λ) agent; the identity of the first period policy is suppressed for
16The value λ ≈ .653 is used for this and most subsequent figures.
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Figure 3: Principal’s Equilibrium Policy Choices
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clarity. To understand why a more intrinsically-motivated agent encourages experimentation
requires developing some intuition for what drives the principal’s decision to experiment. For
the principal to experiment with a policy in equilibrium, she must not only be willing to try
it out – she must also be willing to abandon it if it fails. Otherwise, the agent would expect
her to ignore failure and rigidly continue with the policy into the second period. What
determines the principal’s willingness to abandon her initial policy after failure? Formally,
she will do so for policy a (i.e. x1 = a, x2 (a, 1) = a, x2 (a, 0) = b) if and only if the
inequality h (e1, θ1) < 1 − h (e1, θ2) holds. Intuituively, the condition is that failure pushes
the principal (posterior) belief h (e1, θ1) that a is correct below the agent’s posterior posterior
belief 1− h (e1, θ2) that b is correct.
Intuitively, two factors determine whether this will occur: (1) the strength of both players’
initial beliefs in favor of a, and (2) the agent’s effort to implement it. The latter factor
is crucial because the informativeness of failure is endogenous to the agent’s effort: both
players find failure to be relatively more persuasive evidence that a is in wrong when the
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Figure 4: Effect of Intrinsic Motivation on Principal’s Experimentation
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agent worked harder to implement it.17 Since the agent’s initial effort e1 on any policy is
higher when he is more instrinsically motivated (i.e. has higher λ), the principal is more
willing to abandon the initial policy after failure, and thus more willing to experiment.
An interesting implication of Proposition 3 is that among organizations where outcomes
can be effectively measured, those with more intrinsically motivated subordinates should also
exhibit a greater propensity toward experimentation. This comparative static accords with
the existing hypothesis that public organizations whose employees have a “shared vision”
should be learning and adaptive (Moynihan and Landuyt 2009), but the intuition in our
analysis is different. More intrinsically motivated subordinates implement policies more
effectively; consequently, the outcomes of those policies are more informative about their
underlying quality.
17Formally, l.h.s. of the necessary inequality is decreasing in e1 while the r.h.s. is increas-
ing.
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The principal underexperiments (unless she has help)
In Proposition 2, we showed that a principal who experiments reaps a motivational benefit
from her agent. However, the analysis above demonstrates that the principal’s ability to
capitalize on this benefit is constrained by her own beliefs. Experimenting with a policy
requires her to abandon it if it fails. However, she may be unwilling to do so if her initial
beliefs in its favor are too strong.
This constraint on experimentation creates an interesting commitment problem in the
model. Sometimes, a principal with relatively strong beliefs in favor of a policy would prefer
to experiment with it in order to better motivate the agent, but after actually observing
failure will want to renege on the experiment and persist with the initial policy. Anticipating
this, the agent will work less and experimentation will collapse in equilibrium. Formally, we
have the following result.
Proposition 4. For some beliefs (θ1, θ2) the principal rigidly implements some policy x
∗1 ∈
{a, b} even though experimenting with it would yield higher ex-ante expected utility. Con-
versely, the principal never experiments with a policy when rigidly implementing it would be
better ex-ante.
The cross-hatched regions in Figure 5 depict the subset of the belief-space where the principal
underexperiments. In the upper right region, the principal would be best off experimenting
with a, but her initial beliefs in its favor are too strong and she rigidly implements it. In
the lower left region, the principal would be best off initially deferring to the agent by
experimenting with b, but the agent’s beliefs in b’s favor are so strong that the principal will
again rigidly implement it.18
Because underexperimentation results from the principal’s power to block policy change
after a failure occurs, Proposition 4 suggests that there can be managerial rationale for
18This commitment problem is also the reason for the jagged region in the upper-right
quadrant – here it is optimal for the principal to experiment with a, but her beliefs in its
favor are so strong that she instead experiments with b.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Underexperimentation
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institutional arrangements that help organizational decisionmakers commit ex-ante to make
such changes. Below, we explore two common arrangements in political organizations that
can achieve this end.
Creating Costs to Rigidity One way underexperimentation can be ameliorated is by cre-
ating exogenous costs to rigidly maintaining failed policies.
Proposition 5. For any beliefs (θ1, θ2) s.t. the principal underexperiments, there is a cost c
of maintaining policy after failure that makes her optimal policy experiment an equilibrium.
How might political organizations generate such costs in practice? One way is to enact
trigger mechanisms that make a “pre-negotiated commitment... specifying what actions
will be taken if monitoring information shows x or y” (Nie and Schultz 2012). Because
trigger mechanisms can usually be overridden in most political environments, their practical
effect is to create costs to policy rigidity rather than eliminate it entirely. Such mechanisms
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were recently proposed in debates over health care reform19 and national security policy
(Gates 2014, p375), and are commonly justified on accountability grounds. Our results,
however, also suggest a managerial rationale for triggers; public managers may themselves
prefer to have such mechanisms in place to ensure their own commitment to experimentation
and better motivate their subordinates.
A second arrangement that can create create costs to rigidity is requiring written or oral
statements from managers that detail past policy outcomes and explicit plans for improve-
ment; such procedures effectively magnify the personal and professional embarrassment of
maintaining failing policies. A recent example is the Compstat program in New York City.
Although the program is primarily known for analyzing high-frequency crime data to spot
trends, its central component is actually a highly formalized weekly meeting where “precinct
commanders appear before several of the department’s top brass to report on crime prob-
lems in their precincts and what they are doing about them” (Weisburd, Mastrofski, Mcnally,
Greenspan, and Willis 2003). Program designer Jack Maple describes the purpose of meet-
ings as follows: “nobody ever got in trouble because crime numbers on their watch went
up... trouble arose only if the commander’s didn’t know why the numbers were up or didn’t
have a plan to address the problem” (Maple and Mitchell 2010).
Appointing Moderate Middle Managers An alternative mechanism that political orga-
nizations can use to enhance their commitment to experimentation is to simply appoint
individuals to make policy decisions whose intrinsic beliefs are amenable to it. In the follow-
ing proposition, we show that the principal is sometimes better off delegating policy decisions
to an individual whose beliefs in favor of the optimal policy are more moderate than her own,
and is therefore more willing to abandon it after failure.
Proposition 6. Suppose that a principal with beliefs θ1 could appoint a player with beliefs θˆ1
to make policy decisions in her place. If appointing herself is not optimal, then any optimal
19http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/prescriptions/2009/10/public option lite.html
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appointee θˆ∗1 believes less strongly in the resulting policy x
∗1 than the principal does.
Because most political organizations are multi-tier hierarchies, elected political princi-
ples routinely select the intermediaries who will represent them in the bureaucracy, such as
bureau chiefs and cabinet secretaries. Proposition 6 suggests that the best appointees for
highly ideological political principles may not be ideological “clones,” because they will de-
motivate intrinsically-motivated bureaucrats with their unwillingness to respond to negative
policy feedback. Instead, the aims of highly ideological principals may actually be better
achieved by appointing moderates, whose publicly-known beliefs make a commitment to ex-
perimentation and “data-driven management” credible.20 This insight is consistent with
statistical evidence that Presidents make ideologically divergent appointments to federal
agencies (Bertelli and Grose 2011).
The Reagan administration’s experience managing the Environmental Protection Agency
furnishes an example of this strategy. Within the EPA, intrinsically motivated bureaucrats
must make regulatory policy under considerable technical uncertainty about the consequence
of their actions. President Reagan’s first appointee to run the EPA was Anne Gorsuch, a
strong conservative ideologue who “shared the president’s environmental policy agenda” and
“firm convictions about the negative impact that environmental regulations had on economic
growth” (Golden 2000, p. 120). Her brief tenure was marred by a crisis of morale among
career bureaucrats, who responded not with “deliberate foot-dragging or sabotage” but a
severe waning of “commitment,” “enthusiasm,” and voluntarily effort. After resigning in
controversy, Gorsuch was replaced by William Ruckelshaus, also a committed conservative
but with an “open” and “data driven” management style that permitted a more responsive
and experimental approach (Dobel 1992, p. 251). Despite the opposition of environmental
groups and his strong commitment to right-leaning policies like cost-benefit analysis, “Ruck-
elshaus was regarded as a savior” by EPA bureaucrats who “wanted to work for him.” The
20For a contrasting perspective on the optimal selection of middle managers see Van den
Steen (2005).
27
stark contrast in bureaucratic motivation under the two appointees led Golden (2000) to
speculate that “there may be two roads to compliance” in selecting Presidential appointees.
President Reagan continued to appoint moderate EPA heads for the remainder of his tenure.
Experimentation is biased toward the agent
In the preceding sections we focused on the principal’s decision about whether to experi-
ment, but have not yet analyzed how she will experiment. We now turn to this question.
Specifically, when will the principal experiment by forcing the agent to initially try out the
policy he believes in (a)? When will she experiment by deferring to the agent and giving the
policy he believes in (b) a chance to succeed?
In the No Learning benchmark in Section 3, the principal defers to the agent as a sort of
second-best coping strategy given their irresolvable disagreement. The principal needs him
to work hard in order to achieve a success, and when his beliefs are stronger than her own
she decides that more effort on an inferior policy is better bet than less effort on a superior
policy. In the main model, however, there is also the potential for additional learning and
persuasion; the principal could be persuaded by the failure of a that b is the superior policy,
and similarly the agent could be persuaded by the failure of b that a is the superior policy.
Crucially, more effort by the agent on the initial policy actually facilitates this process;
it makes the initial outcome more informative about the policy’s true underlying quality,
resulting in better future decisions by both the principal and the agent (Section 4) and less
future disagreement.
Since the principal can elicit greater initial effort from the agent by simply deferring to
him, these informational benefits create an extra bias in the principal’s initial policy decisions
toward the policy initially desired by the agent. This yields the following result.
Proposition 7. When the principal experiments, she defers to the agent in the first period
for a greater set of initial beliefs than in the No Learning benchmark. When she does not
experiment, her policy decisions are unchanged.
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The bias in the principal’s initial decisions relative to the No Learning benchmark can be seen
in the left panel of Figure 6, which replicates the principal’s equilibrium policy choices and
demarcates the region of additional deference as compared to the No Learning benchmark
in Figure 1. The deference region is strictly larger in the game with learning than in the
No Learning benchmark. It also expands to include cases where the principal is essentially
certain that policy a is right policy; we soon return to this striking property.
Substantively, Proposition 7 implies that the beliefs and opinions of subordinates will
exert greater influence on policy decisions – sometimes significantly greater influence – in
organizations where learning and experimentation can occur. The reason is that the benefits
of motivated subordinates are greater when this will also facilitate organizational learning.
Figure 6: Bias and Deference in Equilibrium
Principal chooses x1=a 
  
Equilibrium Policies 
additional  
deference 
principal’s  
beliefs 
agent’s beliefs 
Principal chooses x1=b 
Principal chooses x1=a 
  
Equilibrium Policies 
principal’s  
beliefs 
agent’s beliefs 
Principal chooses x1=b 
principal  
always 
defers 
An additional implication of Proposition 7 is that introducing the ability to learn and
experiment to political organizations – through new technology or the development of for-
mal procedures to measure outcomes – should result in greater deference to subordinates.
Interestingly, this combination of performance measurement and increased deference closely
resembles the core principles of the National Performance Review, a high profile manage-
ment initiative during the Clinton administration that sought to implement assorted “New
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Public Management” ideas in U.S. federal agencies. Aberbach (2000) describe how the NPR
combined performance measurement with the directive that “decision-making power should
be decentralized, giving lower-level employees more authority to make decisions.” We later
return to this application in our discussion of empirical implications.
Principals sometimes defer to persuade
Finally, we consider the question of exactly how much the principal’s initial policy decision
will be biased toward the agent when learning can occur.
In the No Learning benchmark, the principal will always impose her desired policy when
she is sufficiently sure that it is the right one; there is no point in eliciting high effort on the
wrong policy. This intuitive property is shared by classical principal-agent models in which
the incentive to defer comes from the desire to exploit the agent’s expertise; if the principal
is already sure she knows the right policy, then there is no expertise to exploit and no reason
to defer.
In our model with learning, however, something quite different happens. If the agent’s
beliefs are sufficiently extreme, and her intrinsic motivation is sufficiently strong, then the
principal will always defer to him initially by selecting policy b – even when she is sure that
he is wrong.
Proposition 8. When the agent is both sufficiently motivated
(
λ > λˆ ∈ (λ, λ)) and believes
sufficiently strongly in b (i.e. θ2 close to 0), then the principal always defers initially and
selects policy x1 = b regardless of her own beliefs.
The right panel of Figure 6 demarcates the region of the belief space where the principal
always to the agent and selects policy b even when she is effectively certain that a is right.
The agent’s intrinsic motivation λ is fixed at some λ > λˆ where the effect occurs.
If the bias in the principal’s policy decisions is due to the informational benefits of
first period effort, why does a principal who is already sure of the right policy defer to
realize these benefits? The reason is that the target of the information produced by the
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additional effort is the agent himself. Specifically, the principal defers in order to persuade
the agent that his initial beliefs are wrong, and to instead work hard on policy a in the
future. This works because allowing the agent an opportunity to prove that b is the right
policy strongly motivates him, making failure all the more persuasive when it (from the
principal’s perspective) inevitably occurs. The alternative – forcing the agent to implement
policy a immediately – is less effective for persuading the agent to support a in the future
because he will exert low effort, so a failure will likely occur and (slightly) reinforce his initial
beliefs.21 Our model thus captures a realistic feature of political organizations that is absent
from previous political agency models; the incentive to defer can arise not only from the
desire to exploit a subordinate’s expertise or better motivate them, but also to persuade
them and build future consensus that the organization’s strategy is the right one.
Proposition 8 illustrates the benefits of a relatively “hands off” approach to managing
political organizations in which learning through experimentation can occur. Such benefits
are frequently touted by public managers. For example, successful former NYPD William
Bratton characterizes his management style as one in which he “pick[ed] good people and let
them do their jobs,” ”gave his people room to maneuver” and “turned responsibility back
onto the worker.” (Bratton 1998, p. 127). Similarly, Heclo (1977) recounts how an assistant
secretary rationalized his failure to discipline an actively insubordinate bureaucrat in the
following manner: “the agency won’t get good ideas if you crush the guys running around
advocating them.” Our model provides a new microfoundation for this managerial strategy,
and generates additional implications about when it will be most effective. For example,
deferring to the agent to “teach” him that he is wrong cannot be effective unless the agent
is already sufficiently motivated intrinsically to achieve the organization’s goals (i.e. has
high λ) – otherwise, he will not be especially motivated by deference, and so not especially
21Mathematically, when ω = a and the principal rigidly implements a, the agent’s expected
future belief that a is right e1 +(1− e1)h (e1, θ2), which will be low since θ2 and consequently
e1 is low. If ω = a but the principal experiments with b, then the agent’s expected future
belief that a is right is 1 − h (e1, 1− θ2), which will be (relatively) high since 1 − θ2 and
consequently e1 are high.
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persuaded to revisit his beliefs by the failure that results.
6 Empirical Implications
In the study of principal-agent relationships in political environments, the idea that policy-
makers are uncertain about how to achieve their policy goals has long been central. However,
the previous literature has largely focused on only one aspect of this uncertainty – that an
agent may have superior information that he wishes to exploit about the consequences of
different policies.
In this paper, we consider a different, but also empirically relevant, aspect of this uncer-
tainty – that principals and agents might openly disagree about how to achieve goals that
they share. To explore the implications of this disagreement, we develop two models of
policy choice and implementation in a political organization – one in which policy outcomes
cannot be observed, and another in which they can be observed and learned from. Our
main insights are threefold. First, we show that being able to observe and learn from policy
outcomes improves the efficiency and motivation of agents, even when principals themselves
ignore the information. Second, we identify motivational benefits to experimentation, and
demonstrate that principals sometimes benefit from institutions that encourage, force, or
select them to be responsive to negative policy feedback. Finally, we demonstrate that there
can sometimes be an extraordinary degree of deference to the beliefs of agents driven by the
desire to persuade.
The results of our analysis generate a variety of empirical implications for the study
of many types of political organizations, but especially of federal bureaucracies. Existing
research in public administration strongly supports the proposition that federal government
employees are by-and-large “intrinsically motivated,” like the agents in our model (Perry
and Hondeghem 2008). Moreover, frequent disagreements about how to achieve agency
goals between political appointees and career bureaucrats are extremely well documented by
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case studies of federal management.22 Finally, since the early 1990s the federal government
has undertaken over two decades of intensive reform efforts seeking to bring performance
measurement to federal agencies; that is, to change federal agencies from organizations where
outcomes cannot be observed and learned from, into ones where they can. While the rationale
and form of these efforts have often shifted, the emphasis on measuring performance has
remained constant; the Government Performance and Results Act (1993) sought to generate
such data to improve Congressional budgeting and decisionmaking (Long and Franklin 2004);
former Vice President Gore’s “National Performance Review” of federal agencies sought to
improve performance measurement as part of an ambitious package of managerial reforms
to enhance the efficiency of government (Thompson and Riccucci 1998); and the Bush-era
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) sought to both promote performance data use
and measure agencies on a common scale (Lewis 2008).
The federal government has collected voluminous data tracking the efficacy and conse-
quences of these reform efforts, which offers the opportunity to test many of the predictions
of our models. Since 2002 the U.S. Office of Personal Management (OPM) has adminis-
tered annual or biennial surveys of federal employees across agencies and ranks that can
be used to track key variables in our model; specifically effort, intrinsic motivation, and
managerial styles.23 The U.S. Government Accountability Office has also conducted three
cross-agency surveys of federal managers since 2003 measuring both whether federal agencies
have introduced useful performance data, and whether that performance data is being used
to guide agency decisionmaking.24 By combining these data, we can paint a picture both
across agencies, and across time, about when reliable performance was introduced, and the
consequences of doing so for employee effort and managerial practices.
One set of predictions that we can test for is the “basket” of organizational changes that
22See for example Heclo (1977) and Golden (2000).
23Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS); 2013 summary available at
http://www.fedview.opm.gov/2013files/2013 Governmentwide Management Report.PDF.
24Summary of 2013 survey is available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-519SP
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we predict when moving from the variant without learning to the variant with learning: ef-
fort, experimentation, and deference to subordinates should all increase. This transition can
be measured in the data by the introduction of effective performance measures to an agency.
We can also test a second set of predictions about patterns specific to organizations where
outcomes can be measured: (1) there should be greater experimentation in agencies where
subordinates are more intrinsically motivated, and (2) subordinates should be more moti-
vated in agencies where managers actually use performance data in their decisionmaking, i.e.
experiment. Preliminary evidence for this latter prediction already exists from the Clinton-
era NPR reforms, which explicitly combined performance measurement with a directive to
“give lower-level employees more authority to make decisions,” i.e. defer (Aberbach 2000).
An important component of these reforms was the introduction of “reinvention labs,” where
agencies could receive a special designation and expedited rule waivers for experimental
projects spearheaded by low level and front-line bureaucrats. A 1996 GAO study of the
reinvention labs found evidence that they had significantly improved agency effort, morale,
and performance (U.S. Government Accountability Office 1996).
Finally, our model, combined with these data, can be used to generate new testable
predictions about Presidential appointments of federal agency heads, a question that has re-
ceived extensive attention in the literature. Recent empirical work finds that Presidents do
not appoint ideological “clones” to run executive departments (Bertelli and Grose 2011). Our
model suggests one reason why. In the model with learning, we find that a highly-ideological
principal sometimes benefits from delegating her decisionmaking authority to a more moder-
ate individual whose commitment to experimentation and “data-driven” management is more
credible than her own. This generates the empirically testable implication that Presidents
should choose less ideological appointees to run agencies that can “learn by doing” with effec-
tive performance measurement, because ideologues will demotivate rank-and-file bureaucrats;
these agencies can be identified using the aforementioned GAO survey data. This finding is
somewhat novel in the Presidential appointments literature, in that it predicts Presidential
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appointments as a function of internal managerial characteristics of the target agency itself.
Previous work on appointments behavior has almost exclusively considered only external po-
litical determinants, such as Congressional-Presidential bargaining (McCarty 2004) and the
behavior of outside interest groups (Bertelli and Feldmann 2007, Gailmard and Patty 2013).
A rare exception is Lewis (2008), who uses the “complexity” of an agency’s tasks as one
predictor of Presidential politicization.
More generally, the idea that “management suffers... when government is run by a
transient group of strangers” has been familiar since Heclo’s (1977) seminal work on the
management of federal agencies. However, the mechanisms through which this occurs are
not well understood. Our model provides a possible microfoundation – agency performance
suffers when appointees and bureaucrats have different beliefs about how to achieve agency
goals, and strategically choose to “go into hiding” or sabotage each other, instead of “edu-
cating” each other “irrespective of their politics” (Starobin 1995). Building a richer model
of appointments based on our foundation could generate new implications about when Pres-
idential appointments most degrade agency performance, and thus what those appointments
will be.
7 Conclusion
Stepping back from the study of principal-agent relationships, our analysis is one of the few to
consider the consequences of open differences in beliefs in politics; the literature has instead
focused primarily on conflict driven by differing goals or ideologies. This is natural given
that citizens’ policy preferences appear closely tied to their economic interests (Gelman 2010)
and legislators’ policy positions are strongly predicted by their seemingly stable ideologies
(Poole 1997). However, history also furnishes examples of large-scale changes in policy pref-
erences that occurred across the ideological spectrum in response to learning through policy
experience. For example, Hall (1993) describes how high unemployment and stagnating
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growth in 1970s Britain discredited Keynsian policies among politicians on both sides of the
ideological spectrum who were “seeking solutions to Britain’s economic problems.” More
recently, the Democratic party in the United States evolved significantly toward market-
driven policies; President Clinton’s FCC Commissioner Reed Hundt describes this evolution
as such – “where the Republicans were right and the old Democrats were wrong, the change
in control of Congress could permit us to do what we thought was best. Auction spectrum.
Shrink the agency. Fight for free trade in communications services...” (Hundt 2000, pp.
98-99).
Our analysis illustrates some interesting incentives that are specific to belief conflicts;
chief among these is the incentive to persuade other individuals that their beliefs are mis-
taken by generating new unbiased information. In our model, this incentive manifests itself
as a somewhat “dastardly” form of deference; a principal sometimes deliberately sets up
her agent for failure in order to effectively persuade him that his beliefs are wrong. This
effect also manifests itself in interesting ways in several other studies of belief conflict and
learning; in Yildiz (2004) disagreement in a bargaining game about recognition probabilities
creates a persuasion-based incentive for delay; in Che and Kartik (2009) disagreement be-
tween a decision-maker and a pool of advisers creates a persuasion-based incentive for costly
information acquisition; in Smith and Stam (2004) disagreement between two states about
their military strength creates a persuasion-based incentive for war. Given the generality
of this effect, it is likely to have implications for policymaking outside of principal-agent
environments.
One potential application of this idea is to the political uses of pilot programs in federal,
state, and local governments. Such projects have historically been justified on technocratic
grounds. However, extending our idea that information can be produced strategically to per-
suade, pilot programs might also be fruitfully thought of as a form of political entrepreneur-
ship. Specifically, individuals and interest groups who are already invested in the value of
specific policies may try to strategically design such programs to maximize the chance of
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generating persuasive evidence of their efficacy to gain political support. This characteriza-
tion of pilot experimentation dovetails with Carpenter’s (2001) account of the behavior of
federal agency heads in early modern America, who engaged in entrepreneurial innovation
on sometimes dubious legal grounds to “convince diverse coalitions... of the value of their
ideas” (Carpenter 2001, p. 30). Developing a model of pilot experimentation based on our
insights could generate important implications for when such programs should be used, and
how their results should be evaluated.
Even more generally, such “persuasion”-based incentives might bias the choices of both
citizens and politicians in a setting of repeated policy experimentation like Callander (2011)
when there is belief disagreement. For example, leaders might allow controlled disasters to
occur to persuade other politicians and citizens of the need for action in a crisis; events like
the recent failure of Lehman Brothers and the eventual passage of the TARP come to mind.
Alternatively, some citizens might be willing to temporarily empower extremist parties in
order to “prove” the bankruptcy of their policy ideas to the larger polity and discredit them
in the long term. Moreover, these incentives, if present, would naturally be influenced by the
rules of policymaking a government; for example, incentives to experiment may be enhanced
by supermajority requirements like filibuster rules in the U.S. Senate because it is more
essential to persuade and build broad consensus. We hope to explore these and related
avenues in future work.
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Online Appendix
A Equilibrium Characterization
We now introduce additional additional notation and provide general equilibrium conditions
for the baseline model. A strategy for the agent consists of two functions e1 (x1) , e2 (x1, e1, y1, x2)
to [0, 1] mapping histories to effort. Since the principal cannot observe the agent’s effort,
her strategy is a probability p1 of initially choosing policy a, and probabilities px
1
y1 of sticking
with the initial policy x1 after outcome y1 for every (x1, y1).
The Agent’s Problem In the second period the agent exerts effort e2 (x1, e1, y1, x2) =
λP2 (ω = x
2 |x1, e1, y1) and his expected utility is λ
2
[P2 (ω = x
2 |x1, e1, y1)]2. Denoting his
prior that ω = a as θ and his initial effort as e for simplicity, his expected two-period utility
when x1 = a as a function of first period effort is
U2
(
e, θ, pas , p
a
f
)
=
(
θe− e
2
2λ
)
+
λ
2
(
paf · θ (e+ (1− e)h (e, θ)) +
(
1− paf
) · (1− θ) (1− h (e, θ)))
+
(
pas − paf
) · λ
2
θe. (5)
By symmetry his expected utility from effort e1 on some policy x is U2
(
e1, P2 (ω = x) , p
x
s , p
x
f
)
.
To derive equations (3) and (4) observe that “rigidly implementing x” is equivalent to(
pxs = p
x
f = 1
)
and “experimenting with x” is equivalent to
(
pxs = 1, p
x
f = 0
)
; thus, eqn.
(3) is U2 (e
1, θ2, 1, 1) and eqn. (4) is U2 (e
1, θ2, 1, 0).
The Principal’s Problem The principal’s second period policy choices must be interim-
optimal given e2 (x1, e1, y1, x2) and her posteriors computed with the agent’s equilibrium
strategy. Thus, she must stay with the initial policy x if it succeeds(pxs = 1), and can only stay
with the initial policy if it fails
(
pxf > 0
)
i.f.f. h (e1 (x) , P1 (ω = x)) ≥ 1−h (e1 (x) , P2 (ω = x)).
If the inequality is strict then pxf = 1. In period 1 the principal’s expected utility from se-
1
lecting policy a when she expects effort e1 and future equilibrium behavior is,
U1
(
e1, θ1, θ2, p
a
s , p
a
f
)
= θ1
(
e1 + λ
(
e1pas +
(
1− e1) paf · h (e1, θ2)))
+ (1− θ1)
(
1− paf
)
λ
(
1− h (e1, θ2)) (6)
By symmetry her expected utility from some x is U1
(
e1, P1 (ω = x) , P2 (ω = x) , p
x
s , p
x
f
)
.
Equilibrium Conditions The following conditions are necessary and sufficient for equi-
librium.
Lemma 1. Strategies
(
x1, pas , p
a
f , p
b
s, p
b
f
)
and (e1 (x1) , e2 (x1, e1, y1, x2)) are an equilibrium
i.f.f.
(Agent Optimality)
1. e2 (x1, e1, y1, x2) = λP2 (ω = x
2 |x1, e1, y1) (the agent optimizes in the second period)
2. e1 (x) ∈ arg max
e1∈[0,1]
{
U2
(
e1, P2 (ω = x) , p
x
s , p
x
f
)} ∀x ∈ {a, b} (the agent optimizes in the
first period given the principal’s strategy and expectations about his own future effort)
(Principal Optimality)
1. pxs = 1 ∀x ∈ {a, b} (the principal always stays after success)
2. pxf ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ h (e1 (x) , P1 (ω = x)) ≥ 1 − h (e1 (x) , P2 (ω = x)) and = 1 if satisfied
with strict inequality (the principal only stays after failure if it is interim-optimal given
on-path posteriors)
3. x1 ∈ arg max
x∈{a,b}
{
U1
(
e1 (x) , P1 (ω = x) , P2 (ω = x) , p
x
s , p
x
f
)}
(the principal’s initial policy
choice maximizes her expected continuation value). 
2
B Proofs
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
The agent’s objective function in first period effort e1 given x1 = a is U2
(
e1, θ2, p
a
s , p
a
f
)
; say
that it is well-behaved when there is a unique interior optimum characterized by the lowest
(and possibly unique) solution to the FOC. This property is not straightforward because the
objective function is not generically concave. In Lemma 2 in the Supplemental Appendix we
show the set of λ s.t. the problem is well-behaved for all feasible parameters is an interval
λ ∈ [0, λ¯) where λ¯ ≈ .68466, and henceforth proceed assuming this property holds. The proof
has 3 parts; first we provide a first-order characterization of the agent’s optimal effort, second
we show that effort is higher with rigid implementation than in the no learning benchmark,
and higher with experimentation than rigid implementation, and third we show that when
the principal rigidly implements a policy, observing outcomes generates a higher probability
of success in both periods.
Part 1 We temporarily write e1 as e and θ2 as θ for simplicity, and before taking the deriva-
tive we note a few useful properties. First, the derivative w.r.t. e of the agent’s posterior
belief after failure is ∂h(e,θ)
∂e
= − θ(1−θ)
(1−θe)2 . Next, the derivatives of both θ (e+ (1− e)h (e, θ))
and (1− θ) (1− h (e, θ)) w.r.t. e are,
λ
2
θ · k (e, θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1) , where k (e, θ) = (1− h (e, θ))2 (7)
To show this use that (1− e) ∂h
∂e
= −h (·) (1− h (·)) and − (1− θ) ∂h
∂e
= θ (1− h (·))2. It is
also easy to verify that k (e, θ) is increasing and convex in e. Now applying these observations
and rearranging, we have
∂U2
∂e
=
1
λ
(
−e+ λθ
(
1 +
λ
2
[k (e, θ) + δa]
))
, (8)
3
where δa = pas − paf is the increase in the probability of staying with a after success – recall
that pas = 1 (the principal always stays after success in equilibrium) so δ
a ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
when the problem is well behaved we may write the unique interior solution as e∗ (θ2, δa)
where δa = pas − paf and e∗ (θ2, δa) satisfies
e∗ (θ2, δa) = λθ
(
1 +
λ
2
[k (e∗ (θ2, δa) , θ2) + δa]
)
Applying symmetry, the agent’s unique best-response to either first period policy x ∈ {a, b}
is e∗
(
P2 (ω = x) , p
x
s − pxf
)
.
Part 2 Rigid implementation corresponds to pas = p
a
f = 1 → δa = 0, and effort in the no
learning benchmark is λθ. Since
∂U2(e1,θ,1,1)
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e=λθ
= λθ
2
k (e, θ) > 0 ∀θ ∈ (0, 1), e∗ (θ, 0) > λθ.
Next, ∂U2
∂e∂δa
= λ
2
θ > 0; thus, e∗ (θ, δa) is increasing in δa. Consequently, experimenting(
pas = 1 and p
a
f = 0→ δa = 1
)
elicits more effort for all θ than rigid implementation (δa = 0).
Finally, because the preceding results are shown for all θ ∈ [0, 1], they apply to both x1 ∈
{a, b} by symmetry.
Part 3 The probability of success being higher in the first period follows immediately from
the agent’s greater effort. In the second period, when the agent exerts first period effort e1
and optimizes in the second period the expected second-period probability of success equal
to,
θ · (λ (e1 + (1− e1)h (e1, θ2))) ,
where θ2 is the agent’s prior, and θ is the true probability. This is increasing in e
1 and equal
to the probability of success in the no learning benchmark θ · λθ2 at e1 = 0, proving the
result. 
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Proof of Proposition 3
We proceed in two parts. In Part 1 we make an equilibrium selection and introduce additional
notation employed in the subsequent proofs. In Part 2, we prove the proposition with a
mixture of analytical and computational arguments.
Part 1 Lemma 4 in the Supplemental Appendix proves that whenever experimenting is
an equilibrium in a subgame x1, it is the optimal strategy for the principal even if she
could precommit to her future decisions. Thus, absent commitment it must also be the
best possible equilibrium for the principal. Furthermore, if experimenting with x1 = a
is not an equilibrium of the subgame following x1 = a, then the unique equilibrium is
rigid implementation. If experimentation is not an equilibrium then h
(
e∗
(
θ2, 1− paf
)
, θ1
)
>
1−h (e∗ (θ2, 1− paf) , θ2) at paf = 0. Another equilibrium with paf > 0 would require that the
l.h.s. ≤ r.h.s. – but this cannot be since e∗ (θ2, 1− paf) is decreasing in paf , so the r.h.s. is
increasing and the r.h.s. is increasing.
We can therefore select the equilibria that are best for the principal by considering only
pure strategy equilibria, and choosing experimentation in a subgame x1 whenever it is an
equilibrium. To do so we introduce additional notation. First let es (θ2) denote the agent’s
first-period best response when the principal’s pure strategy is (x1 = a, s), where s ∈ {R,E}
denotes whether the principal (R)igidly implements or (E)xperiments with the initial policy;
so eR (θ2) = e
∗ (θ2, 0) and eE (θ2) = e∗ (θ2, 1). Second, let V s1 (θ1, θ2) denote the principal’s
two-period expected utility when her pure strategy is (x1 = a, s) and the agent best-responds,
so V R1 (θ1, θ2) = U1
(
eR (θ2) , θ1, θ2, 1, 1
)
and V E1 (θ1, θ2) = U1
(
eE (θ2) , θ1, θ2, 1, 0
)
. Third, let
θ¯ (θ2) be the unique solution to
h
(
eR (θ2) , θ¯ (θ2)
)
= 1− h (eR (θ2) , θ2) , (9)
By Lemma 1, experimenting with x1 = a is an equilibrium of that subgame i.f.f. θ1 ≤ θ¯ (θ2),
5
and it is easy verified that θ¯ (θ2) > 1−θ2. Finally, by symmetry the agent’s effort on x1 = b is
es (1− θ2), the principal’s utility is V s1 (1− θ1, 1− θ2), and the threshold for experimentation
with b is 1− θ1 < θ¯ (1− θ2) ⇐⇒ θ1 > 1− θ¯ (1− θ2).
Part 2 In Lemma 3 in the Supplemental Appendix we show that the agent’s best-response
es (θ2) is increasing in his motivation λ ∀s ∈ {R,E}. Since h (e, θ) is decreasing in e and
increasing in θ, it is straightforward to observe from the definition in (9) that θ¯ (θ2) is
increasing in λ (and consequently 1− θ (1− θ2) is decreasing in λ). Thus, the region of the
parameter space where the principal would experiment down both paths of play is increasing
in the agent’s motivation λ. Now to show that experimentation expands overall, we must
also show that within the regions where the principal rigidly implements one of the two
policies x (and therefore experiments with the other ¬x), increasing λ cannot induce her to
switch from initially selecting x1 = ¬x to x1 = x; we prove this property in Lemma 5 in the
Supplemental Appendix, and the proof relies on the supplemental Mathematica code. This
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4
In Lemma 6 of the Supplemental Appendix, we prove that fixing the principal’s experimen-
tation decisions down each path of play, if she prefers x1 = a given beliefs θˆ1 then she also
prefers it for all higher beliefs. We call this property “preference monotonicity” and employ
it in the subsequent proofs. First, there is never overexperimentation in equilibrium, i.e., the
principal never experiments with x1 when rigidly implementing either x1 or ¬x1 would be
better. The former is immediately ruled out Lemma 4. The latter also ruled out – if rigidly
implementing ¬x1 were optimal with commitment then it must be better than experimenting
with ¬x1, and by implication the unique equilibrium of the subgame following ¬x1 without
commitment; thus, the principal failing to choose it would be a contradiction.
Next, we there ∃ (θ1, θ2) s.t. underexperimentation occurs, i.e. the principal rigidly im-
6
plements x1 when experimenting would be better. In part 3 of Lemma 9 in the Supplemental
Appendix we show there exists a nonempty interval of θ2 s.t. the principal prefers rigidly
implementing b to experimenting with a when θ1 = 1 − θ¯ (1− θ2). By continuity, rigidly
implementing b is thus the equilibrium outcome for θ1 = 1 − θ¯ (1− θ2) − ε when ε > 0 is
sufficiently close to 0, and it is also worse than experimenting with b since the agent’s effort
drops discretely. Formally,
V E1
(
θ¯ (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)
= U1
(
eE (1− θ2) , θ¯ (1− θ2) , 1− θ2, 1, 0
)
= U1
(
eE (1− θ2) , θ¯ (1− θ2) , 1− θ2, 1, 1
)
> U1
(
eR (1− θ2) , θ¯ (1− θ2) , 1− θ2, 1, 1
)
= V R1
(
θ¯ (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)
The first and last equalities follow from the definitions, the second follows from the definition
of θ¯ (·), and the inequality from U1 (·) increasing in e1 and eE (1− θ2) > eR (1− θ2).
Proof of Proposition 5
If there were an exogenous cost c > 0 of maintaining policy after failure, then for experi-
mentation to fail to be an equilibrium of the subgame following policy x requires that the
principal prefer to reselect x given initial effort eE (P2 (ω = x)), the players’ resulting poste-
rior beliefs, and the cost c. This condition is,
h
(
eE (P2 (ω = x)) , P1 (ω = x)
)− c
λ
> 1− h (eE (P2 (ω = x)) , P2 (ω = x))
Now suppose the principal underexperiments with policy x1∗ when c = 0, and also suppose
w.l.o.g. that x1∗ = a. Experimenting must then be the unique equilibrium of the subgame
following b, it will remain so with any higher cost c > 0, and also rigidly implementing a
is better than experimenting with b. So experimenting with a is the optimal pure strategy
policy sequence with commitment, but not an equilibrium of the subgame following a without
7
commitment. However, it will become one when
c ≥ λ (h (eE (θ2) , θ1)− (1− h (eE (θ2) , θ2))) ,
and so the principal will select it in equilibrium. A symmetric argument holds when the
principal underexperiments with b. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose appointing herself is not optimal; then for a principal with beliefs θ1, the resulting
equilibrium (x∗, s∗) is strictly worse than the equilibrium that would result if the optimal
appointee with beliefs θˆ1 were making policy decisions. Denote this equilibrium (xˆ, sˆ). First
note sˆ must not an equilibrium experimentation decision the subgame following xˆ for θ1
(since otherwise the principal would choose it). We next argue that sˆ = E. If sˆ = R then
by implication experimenting must be an equilibrium of the subgame following x1 = xˆ for
θ1; but then by Lemma 4 it is also strictly better than rigidly implementing sˆ and we have
a contradiction. Finally, since (xˆ, sˆ = E) is an equilibrium of the subgame following xˆ for θˆ1
but not θ1, it follows that
h
(
eE (P2 (ω = xˆ)) , Pˆ1 (ω = xˆ)
)
< 1− h (eE (P2 (ω = xˆ)) , P2 (ω = xˆ))
< h
(
eE (P2 (ω = xˆ)) , P1 (ω = xˆ)
)
,
implying Pˆ1 (ω = xˆ) < P1 (ω = xˆ). 
Proof of Proposition 7
First, whenever the principal rigidly implements a policy x1 in equilibrium, she must also
choose that same policy in the no learning benchmark, since P1 (x
1 = ω) ≥ θ¯ (P2 (x1 = ω)) >
1−P2 (x1 = ω). We next show the set of beliefs where the principal chooses x1 = b expands
by arguing that the following two conditions proved in the Supplemental Appendix are jointly
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sufficient; 1) for all θ2 s.t. 1 − θ¯ (1− θ2) > 12 , a principal with beliefs θ1 = 1 − θ¯ (1− θ2)
weakly prefers rigidly implementing b to experimenting with a, and 2) a principal with
beliefs θ1 = 1− θ2 strictly prefers experimenting with b to experimenting with a. If Property
1 holds, then a principal with beliefs θ1 ∈
[
1
2
, 1− θ¯ (1− θ2)
]
who would rigidly implement
b if chosen also prefers that to experimenting with a and so selects b initially. If Property
2 holds, then the principal prefers experimenting with b to experimenting with a when θ1
is < some θˆ1 that is > 1 − θ2, and thus experiments with b in equilibrium when θ1 ∈[
1− θ¯ (1− θ2) ,min
{
θ¯ (θ2) , θˆ
}]
where min
{
θ¯ (θ2) , θˆ
}
> 1− θ2. (She may also experiment
with b when θ1 > θ¯ (θ2)). This completes the argument.
Property 1 is proved with the aid of Mathematica in Lemma 7 in the Supplemental
Appendix, and requires λ > λ ≈ .23505. Property 2 is proved analytically in Lemma 8 in
the Supplemental Appendix, and holds for all λ < 1. Note that property 2 alone is sufficient
for the desired result if the principal could commit ex-ante to her strategy (pure or mixed);
for θ1 ≤ 1 − θ2 < θ¯ (θ2) experimenting with a is better than any other strategy with a by
Lemma 4, and so if experimenting with b is better than experimenting with a then it is also
better than any other strategy with a. 
Proof of Proposition 8
We first argue that following three conditions on θ2 are jointly sufficient for the principal to
always defer in the first period regardless of her own beliefs; 1) V E1 (0, 1− θ2) ≥ V R1 (1, θ2), 2)
V R1 (1, θ2) > V
E
1 (1, θ2), 3) V
R
1
(
θ¯ (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)
> V E1
(
1− θ¯ (1− θ2) , θ2
)
. Conditions (1)
and (2) jointly imply that experimenting with b is better than both experimenting with or
rigidly implementing a when θ1 = 1; by preference monotonicity (proved in Lemma 6 in the
Supplemental Appendix) this also implies that experimenting with b is better ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, whenever experimenting with b is an equilibrium strategy (θ1 ≥ 1−θ¯ (1− θ2)) it is cho-
sen. Now whenever experimenting with b is not an equilibrium strategy
(
θ1 < 1− θ¯ (1− θ2)
)
,
the principal compares rigidly implementing b to experimenting with a; again applying pref-
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erence monotonicity, condition (3) implies that she prefers the former ∀θ1 ≤ 1 − θ¯ (1− θ2).
All possible principal beliefs are covered, which completes the argument. We next argue that
condition (1) is necessary for the principal to always defer regardless of her own beliefs; if
it fails then V R1 (1, θ2) > V
E
1 (0, 1− θ2). For θ1 > θ¯ (θ2) the principal would rigidly imple-
ment a and experiment with b, and by continuity she also prefers rigidly implementing a to
experimenting with b for θ1 sufficiently close to 1. Thus for such θ1 she selects x
1 = a in
equilibrium and does not defer.
Finally, Lemma 9 in the Supplemental Appendix proves analytically that when λ > λˆ
(where λˆ is the unique solution to λ (1 + λ)
(
1 + λ
2
)
= 1 and ≈ .5214), each of the three
conditions k ∈ {1, 2, 3} holds for θ2 in a nonempty interval (0, εk).25 Since they then all hold
for θ2 ∈ (0, εk), λ > λˆ is therefore sufficient for existence of a range of θ2 where the principal
always defers. In addition, the supplemental mathematica code verifies that condition 1 fails
∀θ2 > 0 when λ ≤ λˆ, which is equivalent to
V E1 (0, 1− θ2)− V R1 (1, θ2)
λθ2
< 0 ∀θ2 ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
when λ < λˆ.
λ > λˆ is thus also necessary for existence of a range of θ2 where the principal always defers.

25Note that we have already shown that property (3) holds ∀θ2 when λ > λ in Lemma 7;
however, the proof is computational. In Lemma 9 we prove analytically that property (3)
holds for sufficiently low θ2 for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
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C Supplemental Appendix
Lemma 2 (Good Behavior). The set of λ s.t. the agent’s problem is well-behaved for all
feasible parameters is an interval λ ∈ [0, λ¯), where λ¯ ∈
(√
5−1
2
,
√
3− 1
)
and is ≈ .68466.
Proof: From the proof of Propositions 1 and 2, the derivative of the agent’s objective
function is
∂U2
∂e
=
1
λ
(
−e+ λθ
(
1 +
λ
2
[k (e, θ) + δ]
))
,
Now observe the following. First, ∂U2
∂e
> 0 at e = 0. Second, ∂U2
∂e
is convex in e, which
follows from the convexity of k (e, θ). Combining the previous two observations, there are at
most two solutions to the first order condition. When there are two solutions the optimum
is either the lower solution or maximum effort e = 1, when there is one solution it is exactly
the optimum, and when there are no solutions the optimum is e = 1. Thus, whenever e = 1
is not the optimum, the problem is well-behaved. Third, observe that if the problem is well
behaved for λ′, then holding the other parameters fixed it is also well behaved for λ′′ < λ′.
The cross partial of the objective function in (e, λ) is e
λ2
+ θ
2
(k (e, θ) + δ) > 0, so the set
of optima must decrease when λ decreases. If the problem were well behaved at λ′ but not
λ′′ < λ′ then e = 1 would be optimal for λ′′ but not λ′, a contradiction.
Thus, for any profile of parameters the set of λ s.t. the problem is well-behaved is
an interval; consequently, the set of λ s.t. the problem is well-behaved for all feasible
parameters is also an interval [0, λ¯). Moreover, λ¯ >
√
5−1
2
since the problem is strictly
concave for all feasible parameters (and by implication well behaved) when ∂U2
∂e
∣∣
e=1
= − 1
λ
+
θ
(
1 + λ
2
(1 + δ)
) ≤ − 1
λ
+ (1 + λ) < 0, which holds i.f.f. λ <
√
5−1
2
. It is also <
√
3− 1 since
best-response effort at θ2 = 1 when the principal experiments is e (1, 1) = λ
(
1 + λ
2
)
< 1 i.f.f.
λ <
√
3− 1.
Finally, in the supplemental mathematica code to this document, we verify that λ¯ ≈
.68466. Since the set of optima is increasing in δa (by ∂
2U2
∂e∂δ
= λθ > 0), to find λ¯ it suffices
to check that the problem is well-behaved ∀θ when δ = 1 (i.e. the principal experiments).
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We thus identify λ¯ by compute the highest λ s.t. ∀θ ∈ [0, 1], the agent’s utility at the lowest
solution to the first-order condition is greater than his utility from e = 1. 
Lemma 3. The agent’s optimal effort e∗ (θ, δ) is increasing in λ and θ.
Proof: In the proof of Lemma 2 we showed that ∂
2U2
∂e∂λ
> 0 – the first comparative static
is thus immediate. The second comparative static is less straightforward because it is not
universally the case that ∂
2U2
∂e∂θ
> 0. However, it suffices to show that ∂
2U2
∂e∂θ
> 0 ∀e ∈ [0, e∗ (1, δ)]
for the following reason; if this condition holds, then it implies that every e ∈ [0, e∗ (1, δ)] is
optimal for at most one θ. Consequently e∗ (θ, δ) must be strictly monotone in θ – otherwise
some e ∈ [0, e∗ (1, δ)] would be optimal for more than one θ. Finally since e∗ (0, δ) = 0 <
e∗ (1, δ) = λ
(
1 + λ
2
δ
)
, it must be strictly increasing.
We now prove that ∂
2U2
∂e∂θ
> 0 ∀e ∈ [0, e∗ (1, δ)] when λ ≤ λ¯ by deriving some λ′ > λ¯ that
is both necessary and sufficient for the desired property. First,
∂2U2
∂e∂θ
=
(
1 +
λ
2
δ
)
+
λ
2
(
k (e, θ) + θ
∂k
∂θ
)
(10)
Second,
∂3U2
∂e∂θ2
=
λ (1− e)
(1− θe)4 ((3− e) θ − 2) ,
whose sign is determined by (3− e) θ − 2 which is strictly increasing in θ. Thus, holding e
fixed ∂
2U2
∂e∂θ
is minimized at θ = 2
3−e . Substituting this into eqn. (10), the minimum value of
the cross partial for a given (e, δ, λ) over all θ must therefore be,
(
1 +
λ
2
δ
)
− λ
2
(
8 + (1− e)
27 (1− e)
)
(11)
This is decreasing in e and therefore achieves its minimum over the range of interest at
e∗ (1, δ) = λ
(
1 + λ
2
δ
)
. Rearranging and substituting in, it is therefore ≥ 0 i.f.f.
−18λ+ 2λ2 + δλ3 − 27 (2 + δλ) (δλ2 + 2λ− 2) ≥ 0 (12)
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Now we conjecture that if the condition is satisfied for some δ then it is also satisfied for all
δ′ < δ; if true it then suffices to check at δ = 1. Substituting this in, the condition reduces
to
54− 36λ− 53λ2 − 13λ3 ≥ 0
The l.h.s. is a cubic polynomial with a unique real root at λ′ ≈ .687302 > λ¯. Finally,
we check that our final conjecture is correct in the supplemental mathematica code to this
document by verifying that eqn. (12) is≥ 0 ∀λ < λ′ and δ ∈ [0, 1]; thus, λ′ is both a necessary
and sufficient bound for the cross partial to be positive ∀ (e, θ, δ) s.t. ∀e ∈ [0, e∗ (θ, δ)]. 
Lemma 4. Whenever experimenting is an equilibrium of the subgame following initial policy
x1 ∈ {a, b}, then it is also the optimal (pure or mixed) strategy for the principal if she could
precommit to her responses to success and failure.
Proof: Because of symmetry we can restrict attention to the subgame following x1 = a.
Applying the characterization of the principal’s utility in Appendix A and the analysis of
the agent’s best-response in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2, the principal’s utility if she
could precommit to her responses to success and failure
(
pas , p
a
f
)
would be
U1
(
e∗
(
θ2, p
a
s − paf
)
, θ1, θ2, p
a
s , p
a
f
)
(13)
Recall that U1 (·) is strictly increasing in both first period effort e1 and the probability of
staying after success pas holding the other parameters fixed. Since the agent’s best response
effort e∗
(
θ2, p
a
s , p
a
f
)
is also increasing in pas eqn. (13) must therefore be increasing in p
a
s ,
and the optimal choice after success is therefore to always stay, i.e. pa∗s = 1. This feature
is shared with the baseline model without commitment. Intuitively, the reason is that a
higher probability of staying with the initial policy after success is both interim-better for
the principal, and also better motivates the agent ex-ante.
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The principal’s optimal choice after failure pa∗f satisfies
pa∗f ∈ arg max
paf∈[0,1]
{
U1
(
e∗
(
θ2, 1− paf
)
, θ1, θ2, 1, p
a
f
)}
Now the principal’s original utility function U1 (·) can be rewritten as,
θ1e
1 · (1 + λpas)
+
(
1− θ1e1
) · λ (paf · h (e1, θ1)h (e1, θ2)+ (1− paf) · (1− h (e1, θ1)) (1− h (e1, θ2))) ,
and is easy to verify that this is decreasing in paf whenever h (e
1, θ1) ≤ 1− h (e1, θ2), i.e., if
posteriors after failure are s.t. it is better to switch. If experimenting is an equilibrium of
the subgame x1 = a then by definition this property holds for e∗ (θ2, 1). In addition, recall
that U1 (·) is increasing in e1 and that e∗
(
θ2, 1− paf
)
is decreasing in paf . Combining these
observations,
U1 (e
∗ (θ2, 1) , θ1, θ2, 1, 0) > U1
(
e∗ (θ2, 1) , θ1, θ2, 1, paf
)
> U1
(
e∗
(
θ2, 1− paf
)
, θ1, θ2, 1, p
a
f
)
whenever experimenting is an equilibrium. Consequently
(
pa∗s = 1, p
a∗
f = 0
)
, i.e. experiment-
ing, is the optimal strategy with commitment. 
Lemma 5. If the principal prefers experimenting with x1 to rigidly implementing ¬x1 for λ,
she also prefers it for λ′ > λ.
The principal’s utility from rigidly implementing a is V R1 (θ1, θ2) = θ1 ·V R1 (1, θ2) and from
experimenting with b is V E1 (1− θ1, 1− θ2) = θ1 · V E1 (0, 1− θ2) + (1− θ1) · V E1 (1, 1− θ2).
She thus prefers experimenting with b to rigidly implementing a i.f.f.
θ1 <
V E1 (1, 1− θ2)
V E1 (1, 1− θ2) + (V R1 (1, θ2)− V E1 (0, 1− θ2))
. (14)
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and symmetry, she prefers experimenting with a to rigidly implementing b i.f.f.
1− θ1 < V
E
1 (1, θ2)
V E1 (1, θ2) + (V
R
1 (1, 1− θ2)− V E1 (0, θ2))
.
Thus, the desired property holds if the r.h.s. of eqn. (14) is increasing in λ ∈ [0, λ¯] for all
∀θ2 ∈ [0, 1]; we verify this property in the supplemental mathematica code. 
Lemma 6 (Preference Monotonicity). For all (s, s′) ∈ {R,E}2,
V s1
(
θˆ1, θ2
)
> V s
′
1
(
1− θˆ1, 1− θ2
)
→ V s1 (θ1, θ2) > V s
′
1 (1− θ1, 1− θ2) for all θ1 > θˆ1.
In words, fixing the principal’s experimentation decisions down each path of play, if she
prefers x1 = a given beliefs θˆ1 then she also prefers it for any higher belief.
Proof: Because the principal’s expected utility for each first period policy is linear in her
prior beliefs (holding her future experimentation decisions fixed), a nonmonotonicity would
imply that x1 = b is better when ω = a and x1 = a is better when ω = b. The former could
not be true if she is rigidly implementing b since it would always fail, and the latter could
not be true if she is rigidly implementing a. Thus, a nonmonotonicity requires that she be
experimenting down both paths of play. To rule it out, it therefore suffices to show that
experimenting with b is better than experimenting with a when ω = b (given the agent is
predisposed to b, i.e. θ2 ≤ 12). This is,
(1 + λ) eE (1− θ2) + λ
(
1− eE (1− θ2)
)
h
(
eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)
> λ
(
1− h (eE (θ2) , θ2))
Applying the definition, we know eE (1− θ) > λ (1− θ)→ the l.h.s. is > (1 + λ)λ (1− θ2).
Also, eE (θ2) < λθ2 (1 + λ) → the r.h.s. < λ(1−θ2)1−θ22λ(1+λ) . The above inequality will thus hold
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when
(1 + λ)λ (1− θ2) > λ (1− θ2)
1− θ22λ (1 + λ)
⇐⇒ (1 + λ)2 < 1
θ22
≤ 4 ⇐⇒ λ < 1,
and therefore always holds for λ < λ¯ < 1. 
Lemma 7. For all θ2 s.t. 1− θ¯ (1− θ2) > 12 , the principal weakly prefers rigidly implement-
ing b to experimenting with a when θ1 = 1− θ¯ (1− θ2).
Proof: Since 1 − θ¯ (1) = 1 and 1 − θ¯ (1
2
)
< 1
2
, there exists some unique θˆ2 satisfying
1 − θ¯
(
θˆ2
)
= 1
2
s.t. the set of beliefs
[
1
2
, 1− θ¯ (1− θ2)
]
where the principal would rigidly
implement b in that subgame is nonempty. Note that θˆ2 is a function of λ so we henceforth
write θˆ2 (λ) for clarity. Now applying the definitions and rearranging, we wish to show that
∀λ ∈ [λ, λ¯] ,
θ¯ (1− θ2) ·
(
V R1 (1, 1− θ2)− V E1 (0, θ2)
)
>
(
1− θ¯ (1− θ2)
) · V E1 (1, θ2) ∀θ2 ∈ [0, θˆ2 (λ)] ,
where λ ≈ .23505. We verify this step in the supplemental mathematical code. 
Lemma 8. The principal strictly prefers experimenting with b to experimenting with a when
θ1 = 1− θ2 and θ2 < 12 .
Proof: Let φ (θ2) = λθ2
(
1 + λ
2
(
k
(
eE (θ2) , θ2
)
+ 1
))
(1 + λ)−λ (1− h (eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2))
be the principal’s utility difference between experimenting with a and experimenting with
b when ω = a. Applying symmetry, her expected utility difference between experimenting
with a and experimenting with b with prior θ1 is θ1φ (θ2)− (1− θ1)φ (1− θ2). We now wish
to show that this is < 0 when θ1 = 1− θ2 given that θ2 < 12 , i.e.
(1− θ2)φ (θ2)− θ2φ (1− θ2) < 0 ⇐⇒ φ (θ2)
λθ2
− φ (1− θ2)
λ (1− θ2) < 0 when θ2 <
1
2
.
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It is simple to verify that
φ (θ2)
λθ2
=
(
1 +
λ
2
(
k
(
eE (θ2) , θ2
)
+ 1
))
(1 + λ)− 1
1− eE (1− θ2) · (1− θ2) ,
and by symmetry it suffices to show that φ(θ2)
λθ2
− φ(1−θ2)
λ(1−θ2) > 0 when θ2 >
1
2
. Using substitution
and rearranging, we then have that φ(θ2)
λθ2
− φ(1−θ2)
λ(1−θ2) > 0 ⇐⇒
θ2e
E (θ2)− (1− θ2) eE (1− θ2)
(1− θ2eE (θ2)) · (1− (1− θ2) eE (1− θ2)) >
λ
2
(1 + λ)
(
k
(
eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)− k (eE (θ2) , θ2))
(15)
Since the denominator of the l.h.s. is < 1, and 1 + λ < 2, the above inequality holds if the
following yet stronger inequality holds,
θ2e
E (θ2)− (1− θ2) eE (1− θ2) > λ
(
k
(
eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)− k (eE (θ2) , θ2)) . (16)
Now again substituting in the definition of eE (·), the l.h.s. can be rewritten
λ
(
(2θ2 − 1)
(
1 +
λ
2
)
+
λ
2
(
θ22k
(
eE (θ2) , θ2
)− (1− θ2)2 k (eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2))) ,
implying that the desired inequality holds i.f.f.
(2θ2 − 1)
(
1 +
λ
2
)
>
(
1 +
λ
2
(1− θ2)2
)
k
(
eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)− (1 + λ
2
θ22
)
k
(
eE (θ2) , θ2
)
It is easily verified that the r.h.s. <
(
1 + λ
2
) (
k
(
eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)− k (eE (θ2) , θ2)) when
θ2 >
1
2
, implying that the above inequality holds if the following yet stronger inequality
holds:
2θ2 − 1 > k
(
eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
)− k (eE (θ2) , θ2) (17)
We now show that eqn. (17) holds. Substituting in the definition of k (·), observing that
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2θ2 − 1 = θ22 − (1− θ22), and rearranging, we have that the inequality is equivalent to
θ22
(
1− 1
(1− (1− θ2) eE (1− θ2))2
)
> (1− θ2)2
(
1− 1
(1− θ2eE (θ2))2
)
Since eE (θ2) is increasing in θ2, this clearly holds because (1− θ2) eE (1− θ2) < θ2eE (θ2)
when θ2 >
1
2
. The desired property is hence shown. 
Lemma 9. The following three properties hold.
1. When λ > λˆ, V E1 (0, 1− θ2)− V R1 (1, θ2) > 0 for θ2 in a nonempty interval [0, ε1].
2. When λ ∈ [0, 1] , V R1 (1, θ2)− V E1 (1, θ2) > 0 for θ2 in a nonempty interval [0, ε2].
3. When λ ∈ [0, 1] , V R1
(
θ¯ (1− θ2) , 1− θ2
) − V E1 (1− θ¯ (1− θ2) , θ2) > 0 for θ2 in a
nonempty interval [0, ε3].
To show that some function f (θ2) satisfying f (0) = 0 is > 0 for θ2 ∈ (0, ε) where ε > 0,
it suffices to show by continuity that f(θ2)
θ2
∣∣∣
θ2=0
> 0 provided that this quantity is finite. We
now show this for each of the desired expressions.
Property 1: When ω = a, the principal’s utility from experimenting with b is,
λ
(
1− h (eE (1− θ2) , 1− θ2)) = λθ2
1− (1− θ2) eE (1− θ2) ,
and from rigidly implementing a is,
eR (θ2) (1 + λ)+
(
1− eR (θ2)
)
h
(
eR (θ2) , θ2
)
= λθ2
(
(1 + λ)
(
1 +
λ
2
k
(
eR (θ2) , θ2
))
+
(
1− eR (θ2)
)2
1− θ2eR (θ2)
)
Since eR (0) = 0, eE (1) = λ
(
1 + λ
2
)
, and k
(
eR (0) , 0
)
= 1,
1
λθ2
(
V E1 (0, 1− θ2)− V R1 (1, θ2)
)∣∣∣∣
θ2=0
=
(
1
1− λ (1 + λ
2
))− ((1 + λ)(1 + λ
2
)
+ 1
)
.
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Manipulating the above expression demonstrates that it is ≥ 0 i.f.f.
λ (1 + λ)
(
1 +
λ
2
)
> 1. (18)
which holds i.f.f. λ > λˆ by definition.
Property 2: When ω = a, the principal’s utility from experimenting with a is,
eE (θ2) (1 + λ) = λθ2
(
1 +
λ
2
(
k
(
eE (θ2) , θ2
)
+ 1
))
(1 + λ) ,
Since k
(
eE (0) , 0
)
= 1 and applying Part 1, the desired condition is equivalent to
(1 + λ)
(
1 +
λ
2
)
+ 1 > (1 + λ)2
which holds if λ (1 + λ) < 2 ⇐⇒ λ < 1.
Property 3: Using the definition from the proof of Proposition 3, the threshold function
θ¯ (θ2) in closed form is θ¯ (θ2) =
1−θ2
(1−θ2)+θ2(1−eE(θ2))2 . Thus, when θ1 = 1 − θ¯ (1− θ2) the
difference in the principal’s utility between rigidly implementing b and experimenting with
a is,
θ¯ (1− θ2) ·
(
V R1 (1, 1− θ2)− V E1 (0, θ2)
)− (1− θ¯ (1− θ2)) · V E1 (1, θ2) (19)
The first term is the subjective probability that ω = b times the utility difference between
rigidly implementing b and experimenting with a when ω = b. The second term is the
subjective probability that ω = a times the utility of experimenting with a when ω = a (the
payoff from rigidly implementing b when the state is a is 0).
Now to get the desired expression we divide through by θ2 and then evaluate at θ2 = 0
– we do so by dividing θ¯ (1− θ2) by θ2 in the first term, then V E1 (1, θ2) by θ2 in the second
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term, and then evaluating all expressions at θ2 = 0. First,
(
1
θ2
)
· θ¯ (1− θ2) = 1
θ2 + (1− θ2) (1− eE (1− θ2))2
which is equal to
(
1− λ (1 + λ
2
))−2
at θ2 = 0. Second, V
R
1 (1, 1− θ2) = 2λ, V R1 (0, θ2) = λ,
and 1 − θ¯ (1− θ2) = 1 at θ2 = 0. Third, applying part 2 we know
(
1
θ2
)
· V E1 (1, θ2) =
λ
(
1 + λ
2
(
k
(
eE (θ2) , θ2
)
+ 1
))
(1 + λ) which is = λ (1 + λ)2 evaluated at θ2 = 0. Assembling
these observations, the desired expression is
(
1− λ
(
1 +
λ
2
))−2
· (2λ− λ)− λ (1 + λ)2 > 0 ⇐⇒
(
1− λ
(
1 +
λ
2
))2
· (1 + λ)2 < 1
Now the l.h.s. is < (1− λ)2 · (1 + λ)2 = (1− λ2)2 ≤ 1 ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], so the result is shown. 
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